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— THE STRUCTURAL ORIGINS OF TERRITORIAL 




This article develops the concept of territorial stigma by analyzing how it can be 
cultivated at the level of political institutions across administrative divides. I consider the 
case of Detroit’s regional water department, which until 2016 was owned and operated by 
the city and served over 120 suburban regional municipalities. I start by examining the 
cooperative city–suburban water system expansion in the 1950s and then analyze the rise 
of Detroit’s first black-led administration in 1974, after which the water authority became 
a key regional institution that provided an opportunity for white suburban leaders to 
organize against the city. I find that suburban leaders advanced their immediate goal of 
mitigating rate hikes by declaring the city to be greedy and inept, instead of acknowledging 
structural conditions that increased operational costs. This had the effect of reproducing 
racialized stereotypes at the political level, which had enduring effects. The argument 
builds on the existing literature on territorial stigma by (1) identifying state institutions 
as sites for the propagation of stigma and (2) considering stigmatized places in relation to 
their non-stigmatized neighbors. The analysis integrates material-structural and cultural-
symbolic factors in order to understand the perpetuation of regional urban inequalities.
Introduction
We expect water conflicts to develop in arid regions and in undersupplied cities, 
or when municipal services are replaced by corporations, but metropolitan Detroit––a 
region adjacent to the Great Lakes, containing one-fifth of the world’s fresh water––
enjoys a large infrastructure and has been historically managed by the City of Detroit. 
Why, then, has water infrastructure become a site of recurring conflict?
Unlike in other areas, water politics in metropolitan Detroit have not been moti-
vated by water scarcity, but are instead the combined result of the legacy costs of an 
overbuilt infrastructure, and regional balkanization. This situation has led to contests 
over who should control the flow and shoulder the costs of maintaining these increas-
ingly expensive infrastructural systems. Instead of the typical dynamic of a powerful 
central city using its regional influence to extract resources from subordinate munici-
palities (Steinberg and Clark, 1999), by historical circumstance a majority-black, rela-
tively poor and increasingly diminutive city maintained authority over an aging and 
overbuilt water system that was expanded to serve the suburbs. Thus, an otherwise 
‘boring’ (Star, 1999) utility became the principal site for regional relations and a key site 
of suburban–city antagonisms.
In the context of Detroit, the primary social cleavages through which water 
politics have developed are regional boundaries that reflect and reinforce racialized 
divides. Yet, while urban researchers have documented the continued presence of 
racial disparities in housing (see, for example, Massey and Denton, 1993; Sugrue, 1996; 
Turner et al., 2013), employment (Quillian, 2006: 308; Pager et al., 2009) and the loca-
tion of hazardous waste sites (see Bullard et al., 2008), the racial significance of larger 
technical systems such as water and sewerage have not been seriously considered. 
I am grateful to Eric Seymour, Martin Murray, Frederick Wherry, George Steinmetz, Mathieu Desan, Al Young, Alix 
Gould-Werth and Jose Bortoluci for their comments and contributions. Mrs. Beal in the Detroit City Clerk’s office 
helped me to locate many relevant records.
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Because of water’s sacred properties and the fact that pipes frequently penetrate 
otherwise naturalized boundaries, water infrastructure is an especially fruitful site for 
elucidating social cleavages embedded in relations of power (see, for example, Gandy, 
2002; Swyngedouw, 2004; Kaika, 2005). Yet the processes whereby social divides are 
(re-)produced through the administration of water infrastructures, and the inter section 
of racial and ethnic cleavages with water, have not been subject to much investigation. 
Such studies are warranted because US metropolitan areas have experienced increasing 
levels of inter-municipal segregation since 1950s suburban ization, which requires a 
regional perspective that infrastructures can help to illumi nate. Simultaneously, since 
the 1960s anti-black racial biases have been expressed in increasingly laissez-faire and 
euphemized ways, which necessitates the study of institu tions.
This article demonstrates how the issue of distributing costs across a regional 
infrastructural system can become the terrain for a broader politics of territorial 
stigmatization––as rhetoric is disseminated through media, and suburban politicians 
work through the courts, legislature and local governments to shape how a city is 
characterized. Specifically, I show how suburban charges against the Detroit water 
department1 since the 1970s have served to reinscribe racial biases through an outwardly 
‘color-blind’ and laissez-faire language (Bobo et al., 1996; Bonilla-Silva, 1997; 2009) 
that nevertheless drew on racialized tropes in order to perpetuate stigma. This article 
traces how cultural factors such as perceptions and stereotypes produce and reinforce 
justifications for social inequality in urban areas, thus building on efforts to theorize 
territorial stigma––the degradation, or stigmatization, of place (Quillian and Pager, 
2001; Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004; Wacquant, 2007; 2008; Wilson, 2007; Anderson, 
2012; Murphy, 2012; Wacquant et al., 2014)––by: (1) locating institutions (such as city 
administrations and their legalized territories) as mechanisms for the propagation of 
stigma in municipal administrations; and (2) considering a stigmatized place (here, the 
City of Detroit) alongside a valorized one (an alliance of majority-white suburbs) in 
order to situate them relationally.
Why did Detroit’s suburbs organize against the city on the matter  of  water 
admin istration, and what have been the effects? To answer these questions, I consider 
key moments in the history of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD)––
particularly when it was expanded in the 1960s and then contested in the 1970s and 
2010s––in order to illuminate how white suburban politicians contributed to the city’s 
territorial stigmatization. Empirically, I demonstrate how expansion sanctioned under 
a white-led Detroit administration in the 1950s and 1960s facilitated suburban growth, 
producing an overbuilt system. After a black mayor took office for the first time in 1974, 
suburban politicians joined together in an alliance that accused Detroit’s administration 
of predation and incompetence. By the 2000s, when a financial emergency was declared 
immi nent, I argue that these scripts of self-inflicted urban  decline helped to justify the 
need for outside inter vention, while city leaders sought to protect their sovereignty. 
After reviewing exist ing contributions to studies of territorial stigma and the dynamics 
of color-blind racism, I present my evidence in three parts.
Racialized institutions and the origins of territorial stigma
Since the 1960s, when many explicitly racially biased practices were banned by 
law, racial prejudices in the US have become less explicit, instead rooting themselves in 
outwardly ‘color-blind’ claims and ideas (Bobo et al., 1996; Lassiter, 2004; Bonilla-Silva, 
1 The Detroit Water and Sewerage Department system, which was superseded in 2016 by the regionalized Great 
Lakes Water Authority, draws water from two sources on the Detroit River and Lake Huron, after which five water 
treatment plants distribute the water through around 3,400 miles of main pipes using 22 pumping stations and 
17 storage reservoirs. Suburban municipalities, which are the department’s wholesale customers, receive water 
from DWSD’s mains and send it to individual and commercial users through their own distribution systems (Detroit 
Water and Sewerage Department, 2009).
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2009; for a review, see Quillian, 2006). However, despite the declining acceptance of 
explicitly racist ideas, research shows that racial discrimination continues in areas such 
as job seeking (Quillian, 2006: 308; Pager et al., 2009), housing (Massey and Denton, 
1993; Farley et al., 1994; Turner et al., 2013) and traffic arrests (Bates and Fasenfest, 2005), 
suggesting that durable mechanisms continue to perpetuate racial inequalities (see Bobo 
and Charles, 2009, for a review). The persistence of racially biased outcomes prompts 
us to identify less explicit mechanisms for racially dominant groups to sub ordinate 
others in order to maintain their privileged group position (Blumer, 1958). The concepts 
of ‘color-blind’ and ‘laissez-faire’ racism have been put forward to elaborate types of 
racial bias that are sustained by shared cultural codes expressing racial  domina tion 
through references to supposedly apolitical market dynamics, individual preferences, 
or inherent cultural-behavioral limitations (see, for example, Bobo et al., 1996; Bonilla-
Silva, 2009).
We also know that there are implicit ways of discursively marking territories 
as inferior through popular media and everyday conversation (Wacquant, 2007; 2008; 
Jensen and Christensen, 2012; Wacquant et al., 2014). As a mechanism for grafting ideas 
of disorder and criminality onto particular spaces, territorial stigma associates residents 
with damaging traits––for example, as criminal, dangerous or dirty––which become 
domi nant through a process of moving from individuals to populations and then finally 
on to spaces themselves (Quillian and Pager, 2001; Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004; 
Wacquant, 2007; Wilson, 2007; Murphy, 2012). Loïc Wacquant (2007: 68) describes this 
as follows: as a result of tainting, places that were once thriving can become places of 
notoriety, where people ‘commonly hide their address, avoid having family and friends 
visit them at home, and feel compelled to make excuses for residing in an infamous 
locale’. Once spaces instead of groups become identified as dangerous, criminal or dis-
orderly, the social origins of the stigma are obfuscated, and euphemisms allowing for 
claims of color-blindness can proliferate while hiding their origins (cf. Lipsitz, 2011).
Wacquant (2007) has argued that territorial stigma is produced and diffused 
through media, state agencies and ordinary encounters. He describes three stages of 
territorial stigmatization: the fixing of the territory, the disintegration of communities 
within the territory, and the subsequent loss of social support systems. Territorial 
stigma, Wacquant explains, is linked to existing sources of stigma––namely, poverty, 
race or immigrant status––but it is not reducible to them (ibid.: 67). The stigma exerts 
related but independent effects on residents within the territory, such as when they 
apply for a job or seek a loan from the bank––in addition to the damaging effects of the 
process itself, which tends to break down communities and serve as a justification for 
heightened criminalization.
Studies of territorial stigma have tended to focus on its effects and responses, 
with most analyses being limited to the scale of the neighborhood (see, for example, 
the spe cial issue of Environment and Planning A, 2014). How might territorial stigma 
change when it operates at the municipal level, where it is perpetuated across borders? 
How are these stigmatizing tropes cultivated, and what purpose do they serve?
A key source for the production of territorial stigma, this article argues, lies at 
the intersection of political and social (that is, racial, ethnic or class-based) antagonisms 
that allow stereotypes to be applied to state administrations. Locating the origins of 
territorial stigma is essential because, without specification, the source of the stigma 
may be attributed to residents’ own behaviors by default, potentially becoming fuel for 
the indirect expression of racial biases.
From researchers who began identifying the complex roots of territorial stigma, 
we have learned that areas may be stigmatized as a result of the behaviors associated 
with them (such as crime, littering, laziness) or based on the physical attributes of a 
place itself (for example, overcrowded, dirty, graffiti-ridden), and that the sources of 
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this stigma may be located in the state bureaucracy, in the media and in ordinary 
perceptions. As Wacquant (2007: 67) suggests, studies of territorial stigma may pro-
ceed ‘from below’, through ordinary interactions and perceptions, as well as ‘from 
above’, through media, state and academic sources. Studies that look for origins ‘from 
below’ have tended to focus on the physical attributes of neighborhoods. For example, 
Alexandra Murphy’s (2012) careful ethnographic observations help us to identify the 
processes whereby poor, black residents of a middle-class US suburb became stigma tized 
as ‘litterers’ and outsiders, with middle-class residents attributing the litterers’ actions 
to intrinsic traits rather than structural conditions. Similarly, Sampson  and  Rauden-
bush (2004) examined perceptions of disorder and found that whites were more likely 
to report litter, graffiti, drugs and drinking in public spaces as problems, which exag-
gerated the amount of physical disorder they recognized compared to their black 
neighbors. These detailed studies, conducted from the ground up, identify the frames 
that local residents use in order to interpret signs of physical disorder around them, 
thereby contributing to the territorial stigmatization of neighborhoods.
By contrast, studies that take a perspective ‘from above’ have sought to locate 
the social bases and codes through which territorial stigma is cultivated. For example, 
Larsen (2014) shows how states may propagate territorial stigma through the unin-
tended results of bureaucratic logics and structures, which results in privileging par-
ticular values over others. Glasze et al. (2012) finds that while public housing estates 
in Germany, France and Poland were all characterized as threatening in news reports, 
the threat was conceptualized differently in the three countries. Cohen (2013) shows 
how the Israeli city of Bat Yam became coded as crowded, noisy, corrupt and dangerous 
once Mizrahis became the majority. In order to develop the concept of terri torial stigma, 
it is essential to continue to locate the source of the production of the stigma itself, 
keeping in mind that even though sources may be identified, the stigma continues to 
wield an autonomous effect even when its origins are less evident or have diminished 
altogether.
This article advances the concept of territorial stigma by demonstrating how 
it can be cultivated by politicians across legalized borders in order to discredit adminis-
trations. This offers a relational perspective that identifies a key source of stigma 
production outside the territory itself. Unlike the neighborhood scale, municipal or 
state boundaries produce more clearly defined objects that can subsequently become 
saturated with meaning so that it becomes logically possible to make statements about 
entire cities or nations. Instead of the ‘neighborhoods of exile’ that Wacquant describes 
(2007: 169), cities of exile––of which Detroit is an extreme example––allow stigmatiz ing 
associations to become reinforced by state authorities. When a state, ripe with sym-
bolic capital, endorses territorially stigmatizing accusations, those characterizations 
are more likely to become taken for granted (Bourdieu et al., 1994). Throughout the 
US, municipalities have a level of autonomy that makes them responsible for their own 
political authority, revenue-collection practices and credit ratings. This independence 
suggests important parallels between the reigning market system, which promotes a 
system of individual meritocracy, and laissez-faire racism, for both logics deny 
racialized sources of inequalities even while they are realized (Bobo et al., 1997; Wilson, 
2007; Roberts and Mahtani, 2010; Mele, 2013).
Legalized territories––cities, districts, states or countries––may be characterized 
in a similar way to stigmatized neighborhood territories (for example, as dirty or dis-
organized), but there is a set of more relevant tropes that may become grafted onto them. 
Wacquant argues that the rise of territorial stigma in the latter part of the twentieth 
century was a product of several key political-economic shifts: the 1973  finan cial 
crisis, de-industrialization, urban uprisings, suburbanization and declining federal 
aid. To this list I add the rise of black urban administrations. The black mayors who 
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were elected in the mid-1970s and early 1980s across the US may have represented 
empowerment and hope to their supporters (see, for example, Thompson, 2005), but 
many white regional and state leaders characterized them as a threat from the begin-
ning. This original distrust, and the characterizations that were subsequently launched, 
allowed suburban leaders to cultivate legitimacy with their own constituents by 
discrediting the city.
It is this rhetorical strategy––and its enduring effects––that this article details. 
I find that suburban leaders focused on stereotypical ideas of administrative (in)
competence and unsubstantiated charges of corruption, which allowed them to deflect 
critical questions of costs and resources. I locate this dynamic in a case that allows us 
to identify the structural roots of such stereotypes and demonstrate that these can be 
perpetuated across municipal divides, which situates the process as a relational one 
(Bourdieu, 1999: 125). For symbolic and material goods concentrate in particular places 
while becoming noticeably absent in others, effectively marking some areas as valorized 
and others as stigmatized––but always producing them in tandem (ibid.).
In the sections that follow, I ask: Why did water rate hikes become a key source 
of antagonistic politics between the city and the suburbs of metropolitan Detroit? What 
motivated this protest, and what were its immediate and longer-term effects? Answer-
ing these questions can offer us critical insight to the broader issue of how struc tural 
and cultural factors intersect to reproduce regional divisions.
Sources of evidence
The argument presented here relies on two forms of evidence. The first includes 
sources that allowed for the narrative construction of events unfolding over the course 
of several decades in relation to Detroit’s water department. For this purpose, I created 
an archive based on newspaper microfilms from the 1950s through to the 1990s and an 
electronic database for articles from the year 1999. I compiled a total of 220 relevant 
arti cles from The Detroit News between the years 1954 and 1999. Of these, 187 articles 
were from the years 1976 to 1999, which I located by using the newspaper’s print index 
and selecting articles listed under the subject heading ‘Detroit Water and Sewerage’. 
I identified an additional 33 articles available on microfilm for the years 1954 to 1976 
using the subject heading card catalogue available from the Detroit Public Library. 
From the hundreds of articles listed under this heading, I selected those that dealt 
with issues of rates, administration, regional relations and legal disputes. While the 
average number of articles per year (around five) in my total sample is relatively low, 
the articles tended to cluster around particularly notable events: some years had several 
relevant articles while others had none at all––in effect offering a thick description of 
particularly controversial events on matters of rates, administration, regional relations 
and legal cases. For the years 1999 to 2014 I conducted a search for articles under the 
same heading––’Detroit Water and Sewerage’––in The Detroit News holdings in the 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers digital archive and located more than 750 articles, 
which I then narrowed using the same criteria as above. These articles were used in 
order to reconstruct historical events and identify the dominant rhetorical frames.
Although I was not able to access historical records from DWSD directly, I was 
able to obtain the department’s extensive online records and acquire annual reports for 
every year from 1970 through 2011 by filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request 
with the City of Detroit. I was able to locate additional reports, ordinances and financial 
statements through the Detroit City Clerk’s records office. These materials allowed 
the analysis to take into account how the department’s administration and financial 
accounting intersected with discursive politics. To supplement and substantiate these 
primary sources, interviews were conducted with two suburban officials and two city 
officials, and a meeting was held with members of the department’s finance team.
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The structural problem: an overbuilt water system for a changing region 
(mid-1950s to mid-1970s)
The territorial stigmatization that would be cultivated through political antag o-
nisms in the 1970s had structural roots in an earlier era of suburban expansion, when the 
Detroit water department expanded its pipes into newly developing suburbs. Because 
of the region’s ensuing economic decline, this eventually resulted in an excessively 
large system and attendant rising costs––particularly in the abandoned City of Detroit. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s white leaders worked cooperatively across  munic-
ipal boundaries to provide water to the growing metropolitan area. Detroit leaders 
planned for population growth that was never realized, and administrators justified the 
expansion of the water system through a vicious logical circle of expansion that neces-
sitated more revenue, which could only be secured through contracting with additional 
suburban water customers. These were the structural legacies that would inform 
regional relations in the decades that followed.
In 1955, the city provided water to 44 suburban municipalities, which were 
the department’s ‘wholesale customers’, and between 1956 and 1973, when Gerald J. 
Remus was department director, the system was expanded rapidly in order to serve the 
sprawling metropolitan region. A key member of Detroit’s last white-led administration, 
Remus was appointed by Republican Mayor Albert E. Cobo, who served from 1950 to 
1957 and proclaimed himself to be a protector of white homeowners––having won all of 
the white-majority city wards in his election but not a single black-majority one (Galster, 
2012: 198). Remus’s immediate predecessor, Lawrence G. Lenhardt, had called for the 
suburbs to annex themselves into the city in order to get access to Detroit water, but 
Mayor Cobo replaced Lenhardt with Remus because he favored infrastructure expan-
sion and continuing city control (Mowitz and Wright, 1962: 189). In order to facilitate 
expansion, the state legislature consented to lift the limit on the amount of water that 
could be sold to wholesale customers. This allowed 51 new suburban municipalities to 
join the Detroit-run system during Remus’s 18 years as director, bringing the number of 
municipalities served to 96 by the time he departed in 1973 (see Figure 1).
To finance this expansion, the department took on significant debt. In 1956, just 
after Lenhardt’s departure, the department introduced a US $89 million2 program to 
build an intake station 60 miles north on Lake Huron and to increase existing capacity 
at its downriver Springwells station in order to boost the system’s projected total 
capacity to 1.24 billion gallons daily by 1970 (Carlisle, 1956). The expensive upstream 
Lake Huron project, which would begin to supply the City of Flint in 1967, was justified 
with promises not only of increased supply and less pollution, but also with symbolic 
assertions that the water there was more wholesome and pure. The investment was 
described at the time as ‘immense’, but The Detroit News editorial board rationalized 
the decision with widely accepted contemporary logic: ‘it has been the history of the 
local water system that such investments pay for themselves’ (ibid.).
Under Remus’s leadership, the department expanded its infrastructure in order 
to increase rev enue and consolidate the city’s authority in the region, and this required 
cooperating with regional municipalities. The department published a development 
plan in 1959, which argued that the utility would thrive only through centralization 
and expansion: ‘To gain the best reliability at the lowest cost all of the water for the 
area should be provided by one system. It must be ever-expanding and improving or a 
system will deteriorate into an antiquated, undependable, and expensive arrangement’ 
(City of Detroit Board of Water Commissioners, 1959: 2). The need for increased water 
capacity was considered necessary because a series of water shortages had led to lawn-
watering restrictions under Lenhardt, which caused a public outcry (Mowitz and 
2 This amounts to approximately US $740 million in 2015 dollar terms, based on the Consumer Price Index Calculator, 
available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
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Wright, 1962: 171; D’Anieri, 2007: 65). The total cost of the program was estimated to be 
US $172 million, to be financed by the city through a combination of income, bonds and 
federal grant money (City of Detroit Board of Water Commissioners, 1959: 10). Indeed, 
between 1956 and 1968, city records show that the City of Detroit issued a total of US 
$147.5 million in bonds to finance expansion and received at least US $50 million in 
federal aid.3
The expansion of the region’s water system was justified and funded under the 
assumption that the region would continue to grow and serve new residents. However, 
the 1959 master plan’s population projections, which were developed from at least three 
sources, provide evidence that the city had planned its regional water infrastructure 
for a much larger future population than was eventually realized. At the time, plan-
ners predicted that the city’s population would remain stable at just under two million 
people through the year 2000, but suburban growth––within existing municipalities 
and in new ones––would be high. If by 1980 the projections were proving inaccurate, 
with 1.2 million and 2.8 million living in the city and suburbs as opposed to forecasts 
of two million people in the city and 3.2 million in the suburbs, by the year 2000 this 
difference was even greater: instead of the projected 7.2 million people, the Detroit 
metropolitan area was home to only 4.7 million, or 65% of the antici pated population 
(see Table 1). However, once the pipes had been put in place, the burden was placed on 
system users to pay for them––a distributional question that would contribute to the 
resistance from suburban leaders over the next decade.
Under the leadership of Gerald Remus, the Detroit water system was expanded 
throughout the region in order to serve white residents moving to the suburbs, creating 
an extensive network owned and operated by the City of Detroit. During this time, 
when the city was white-led, the city and its suburban neighbors worked in partnership 
to construct the pipes required for Detroit residents to move into new municipalities. 
In effect, they agreed that Detroit could provide water for the suburbs ‘cheaper than 






figure 1 Detroit water system expansion before, during and after Gerald J. 
Remus’s tenure (by municipality and year joined) (source: Detroit Water and Sewerage 
Department and National Historic Geographic Information System (NHGIS); map drawn 
by author, with support from Nicole Scholtz)
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they can provide it for themselves’, so the system’s total capacity was boosted from 
760 million gallons per day to 940 million gallons by 1960 and 1.24 billion gallons by 
1970 (Carlisle, 1956: 20). Water, it seemed at the time, might become the source of a 
cooperative regional authority (Editorial Board, 1954). Instead, in the decades to follow, 
the water department would become a central site of city–suburban conflict.
Generating stigma to reduce costs: suburban leaders organize against 
Detroit (mid-1970s to the 1980s)
Cooperation forged in the 1950s would quickly erode in the 1970s after the 
surprising victory of Detroit’s first black mayor, Coleman Young, in 1973. While 
suburban leaders partnered with city officials in the 1950s to build new water intake 
plants, mains and pumping stations for increasingly distant suburban developments, 
once the region had been divided into several majority-white municipalities with a 
black administration at the center, contests over rates and governance structure ensued.
By the time Mayor Young took office, the Detroit authority served nearly one 
hundred suburban municipalities as wholesale customers, but served only 4 million 
people instead of the 5.5 million that had been projected when the Lake Huron plant 
was approved (Ball, 1975b). These twin ingredients––rising costs owing to an overbuilt 
system that received less federal aid but was subject to increased federal regulation, 
along with a black administration at the helm of a regional institution in a highly seg-
regated and racially charged metropolitan area––would become sufficient cause for the 
area’s white leadership to foment resentment and opposition. They used the issue to 
assert racialized positions to protect their communities from regional responsibilities 
and curry favor with their constituents.
Suburban municipalities contributed to the stigmatization of Detroit in the 
1970s and 1980s through two public claims: first, that rates hikes for suburban custo-
mers were based on unfair and unjustified reasons, and secondly, that the Detroit-
run depart ment was incompetent and untrustworthy and should be replaced with a 
suburban-majority water board. They established the first claim in the judicial system, 
while the second was broached in the state legislature. When these allegations were 
echoed by the region’s media sources, they became associated with the city itself and 
contributed to Detroit’s stigmatization by marking the city administration––and the 
city itself––as incompetent, corrupt and dangerous.
The event that provided an immediate cause for suburban leaders to organize 
was an annual water rate increase that was proposed in 1975 hikes for the following 
fiscal year. The budget proposed for the 1975/76 fiscal year totaled US $94.7 million, 
up from US $73.8 million the year before, requiring the first water rate increase since 
1972 (Ball, 1975a). At the time, Detroit boasted a water rate that was ‘the lowest among 
table 1 Total 1959 population planning projections compared with actual census 
data (in millions)
1959 Projections Actual Population
Citya Suburbsb Region City Suburbs Region
1960 1.93 1.47 3.40 1.67 2.09 3.76
1970 1.98 2.39 4.37 1.51 2.69 4.20
1980 1.96 3.21 5.17 1.20 2.84 4.04
2000 1.96 5.19 7.15 0.95 3.73 4.68
aIncludes only the City of Detroit.
bThe years 1960, 1970 and 1980 include Macomb, Oakland and Wayne counties; the year 2000 includes Macomb, Monroe, 
Oakland, St. Clair, Washtenaw and Wayne counties because the 1959 predictions included these areas for those years.
sources: Projection data from the City of Detroit Board of Water Commissioners (1959: 9); actual population data from the 
US Census (accessed via Social Explorer)
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the nation’s large urban areas’, but the 39% increase was steep (Ball, 1975c). Initial 
newspaper reports did not offer reasons for the rate increase, but later city filings 
explained that they were precipitated by costs resulting from inflation, which had 
produced a deficit in the department’s budget.
Leading the charge against the rate hike to support a budget that he claimed 
at the time ‘almost borders on fraud’ was the ambitious suburban mayor Edward H. 
McNamara, who called for a state audit of the department (Ball, 1975a). McNamara, des-
cribed as a ‘symbol of suburban frustration’ in media reports (Warren, 1976a), was up 
for re-election as mayor of the Wayne County inner-ring, middle-class and 99% white 
suburb of Livonia (Darden et al., 1987: 101) and had been a suburban representative 
on the water board until he was fired later that year by Mayor Young (Warren, 1976b). 
After he was forced out of his position, McNamara took aim at Young through the 
water issue by organizing 160 officials from the department’s 96 suburban municipali-
ties to wage collective action to fight the rate hike; a front-page newspaper headline 
announced plainly at the time: ‘Suburbs to wage water rate fight’ (Warren, 1976b). 
Along with Oakland County Drain Commissioner George Kuhn and Democratic State 
Representative John Bennett, McNamara was expected to run for a US congressional 
seat the following year, and contemporary reports reasoned: ‘there are few easier ways 
of winning political support in the conservative 2nd District than by playing David to 
Detroit’s Goliath’ (Ball, 1975c).
Suburban politicians, led by McNamara, Kuhn and Bennett created a ‘Goliath’ 
out of Detroit by characterizing the department’s decision to raise rates as unfair and 
discriminatory and suggesting that the city was swindling the suburbs. For example, 
Democratic State Representative Aldred Sheridan charged that Detroit residents were 
directly benefitting from the hike: ‘There is nothing uniform about the water rates, 
except the ridiculous low prices being paid in the city of Detroit’ (The Detroit News, 
1975). Similarly, McNamara claimed that the rate increase, which was uniformly 39% 
for city and suburban customers, was ‘obviously unwarranted and unnecessary (Roach, 
1976a). Suburban leaders’ thus charged the city department with raising rates without 
reason in order to benefit their own residents.
In a letter to Detroit City Council members, McNamara made several charges 
that implied that the department was not being run efficiently, including that the 
department’s audit did not reconcile its budget with its expenses, that there was too 
much overtime expenditure, and that there was a surplus of several million dollars in 
the department’s operating fund. Only one charge explicitly suggested malfeasance, 
and even that was anticipation rather than accusation: that the proposal to add 100 new 
employees would lead to unnecessary ‘patronage appointments’ with ties to the mayor’s 
office (Warren, 1976a). Except for this letter by McNamara, contemporary news reports 
did not identify any particular event or activity to justify suburban leaders’ charges of 
mismanagement.
The suburban alliance, which called itself the Suburban Association of Detroit 
Water Customers, launched a class action lawsuit against the city, claiming that the 39% 
water rate increase would result in the ‘unjust enrichment’ of the city at the suburbs’ 
expense (Roach, 1976a). The lawsuit made two claims: first, that the City of Detroit was 
receiving a rate of return on investment beyond their costs, and secondly, that the rate 
hikes were ‘discriminatory because the suburbs already pay more for pumping and 
storage costs’ (Roach, 1976a). As a result of the increases, the plaintiffs charged, the 
city was realizing ‘unreasonably high rates of return on investment’, which violated the 
1957 Michigan law mandating that rates be ‘reasonably related’ to the cost of providing 
service (Supreme Court of Michigan, 1985).
The attorney on the case, George Ward, argued that his suburban clients were 
seeking US $21 million in damages because ‘they were overcharged for water so that 
the city could keep the cost of water service down for its own residents’ (Finley, 1981). 
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Suburban Plymouth city manager Fred Yockey was more explicit: ‘It’s our position that 
the increase is blatantly inequitable’, he charged (Roach, 1976a). The City of Detroit 
countered these accusations, claiming in its court filing that without the rate increase 
the water system would have had a US $1.4 million deficit for the year, but with the rate 
increase the system managed a US $4.6 million surplus, which could be used for capital 
improvements (Roach, 1976c). In fact, even McNamara’s hometown of Livonia had 
raised its customers’ rates by 11% in the same year, the council similarly citing inflation 
as the reason for the increase (Warren, 1976b).
The 1976 water rate lawsuit ultimately received a ruling in Detroit’s favor, but 
the case was tried in three courts over nine years before the Michigan Supreme Court 
finally handed down its decision in 1985. By then, nearly a decade had passed––during 
which time at least two additional lawsuits were filed by the suburbs, along with two 
federal cases––and years of media coverage had led to the department being associated 
with stigmatizing traits such as greed and exploitation. In fact, the 1985 Michigan 
Supreme Court’s decision opined that the lawsuit had been filed despite the fact 
that there was ‘general agreement by the parties that the projection of new revenue 
needs was conservative’ (Supreme Court of Michigan, 1985). These needs included 
anticipated debt reserve requirements and a five-year Capital Improvement Program 
(CIP) that was to be paid for mostly from operating revenue. In other words, the court 
acknowledged the political motivations of the suburban alliance in order to protest rate 
increases via the judicial system.
Indeed, when the audit that suburban leaders had called for was completed and 
results released in March 1976, the findings were summarized as follows: ‘1. It isn’t swin-
dling its suburban water and sewer customers. 2. It isn’t mishandling its funds. 3. It 
isn’t lying about the need for water and sewer rate increases to avert deficit spending’ 
(Ashenfelter, 1976b). Without the 1976 increase, the article detailed, the department 
would have run a deficit, as it had the previous year. Still, this was a single news article 
and appeared only on page 3, unlike earlier reports that were carried on the front page.
Meanwhile, city officials explained that the actual rate individual suburban resi-
dents were charged tended to be higher than the wholesale rate charged by Detroit 
because local water authorities added their own rate and fee structures onto what Det-
roit charged the municipality. For example, in 1979 the Detroit department sold water 
for US $3.11 per unit to Avon Township, a municipality that was active in the suburban 
campaign, but Avon Township charged its residents US $11.43 for the same unit of water 
(Keith, 1979). The amount of the markup depended not only on costs, but also on whether 
suburban wholesale customers chose to charge fees through water rates, or through 
other means such as property taxes or new building fees. When the city eventually 
issued an apology for the 1976 rate hike dispute, the newspaper headline suggested that 
the apology was for administrative graft (‘Water chief admits lapse’), although the city 
was actually expressing regret over its poor communication (Ashenfelter, 1976a).
In fact, a central point of city–suburban disagreement that emerges from these 
contests is the role of debt financing in paying for long-term maintenance and repairs. 
A 1976 city council investigation reported that the 39% rate hike could be cut down 
to 20%, but it continued to explain that the difference would need to be made up 
through bond revenue. In other words, the decision was not a matter of cutting costs, 
but instead of choosing between debt (via bonds) and revenue (via rates) as sources of 
capital (Glazier, 1976). While Director Charles Scales insisted that it was cheaper and 
therefore better for the city to borrow less money and pay more in cash through revenue 
(Roach, 1976b), suburban leaders labeled the department irresponsible for opting not to 
sell US $25 million in bonds that were in the budget (Warren, 1976a). In fact, throughout 
the 1940s to 1960s, the department had routinely posted revenue surpluses––which the 
press referred to as ‘profits’––and these were put towards capital improvements. For 
exam ple, for fiscal year 1964–65, the department posted a ‘net income’ of US $5.6 
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million (The Detroit News, 1966). At that time, however, there were no related charges of 
mismanagement or extortion aimed at the department, and the surplus was presented 
as evidence of responsible administration.
In addition to seeking court action, the suburban group also sought legislative 
action to shift authority over the department to suburban representatives via majority 
control on the water board, which then included four city and three suburban members 
appointed by the mayor. State Representative John Bennett, a Democrat from the inner- 
ring suburb of Redford Township, where there was not a single black-owned home in 
1968 (Darden et al., 1987: 138), introduced three bills to the Michigan House of Repre-
sentatives in 1976 that would require suburban representation on the water board not 
to be subject to dismissal by the mayor, an annual external audit of the department, and 
mandatory public hearings to be held before a rate increase is issued (Warren 1976a). 
While the first proposal was not passed, it became a model for successive attempts to 
gain suburban control via the state legislature over the next four decades.
During the legislative process, suburban leaders cultivated tropes of the city as 
incompetent, criminal and corrupt. For example, Oakland County Drain Commissioner 
George Kuhn explained the rationale for the bills in the following way: ‘The price of 
incompetence should not be spread on suburban customers who are denied any role in 
correcting the incompetence’ (McClear, 1979). John Maynard, a Democratic State Repre-
sentative from suburban St. Clair Shores, described the action to a response to violent 
threat: ‘We have to make the suburban representatives on the board bulletproof’, he 
said, referring to the city administration and its ability to dismiss them (Keith, 1979). 
The 1976 legislative demands were supported by claims that the city’s mismanagement 
of the system was the reason for the proposed rate increases. This, suburban leaders 
argued, necessitated overhauling the department’s administration through increased 
suburban control.
At the center of these contests was Coleman Young, the city’s first black mayor 
and a provocative orator who regularly raised issues of race and suburban hostility. As 
the ultimate authority over the water board, whose members were appointed by and 
subject to his dismissal, Young was a central object of suburban disdain.4 Although the 
administrative system under which Young operated had been in place since 1960, oppo-
sitional suburban leaders charged that Young’s authority over the board amounted 
to ‘one-man rule’ (Editorial Board, 1977). As Detroit became darker and poorer, it 
also became coded by white leaders as dangerous and dishonest. River Rouge Mayor 
James Doig demonstrated the frustration that many suburbanites felt at depending on 
the black-led City of Detroit for water, by commenting: ‘Our hands are tied. We’re at 
their mercy and always have been. We need the water, so we have to pay whatever they 
decide. It’s out of our hands’ (Twardon and Bradford, 1986).
In a set of political cartoons, city–suburban antagonisms are illustrated through 
racialized depictions of Mayor Young. In one image he is shown as a threatening figure, 
armed with a wrench and a gun and threatening to turn off the water in advance of the 
1981 rate hikes (see Figure 2, left). In the second image, Young is sitting with a shotgun, 
as if on his front porch, guarding Detroit’s infamous Eight Mile Road boundary (see 
Figure 2, right), the image suggesting that his armed defensiveness intimidates the 
white suburban couple innocently walking their dog. Although suburban leaders had 
actively cultivated an opposition movement, it was the city and Mayor Young who were 
characterized as threatening.
The suburban unity that was possible after Young’s election contrasted with 
a couple of suburban attempts to exert authority over rates in the 1950s and 1960s. 
A 1956 proposal had sought to put the water department under the oversight of the 
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Michigan Public Service Commission, which would have regulated rates and expansion 
plans while allowing the department to issue bonds at lower interest rates. The measure, 
how ever, was described benignly as ‘an attempt to aid local governments, many of which 
are hard pressed for money to build adequate water supply systems’ and would have 
given the state an additional layer of oversight instead of replacing existing leadership 
(The Detroit News, 1956). In 1966, forty suburban leaders had joined together to support 
a similar measure, but the group lacked widespread support––viewing Detroit, as they 
did at the time, as the region’s lynchpin rather than a common threat (Maharry, 1966).
Another event in the 1970s substantially affected the administration of the 
Detroit water department: in May 1977, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
filed a federal lawsuit against the City of Detroit for dumping excessive pollutants 
into the river. The outcome of the lawsuit was a consent decree leading to the court 
appointing a ‘Special Master’ to oversee the department––a position that would last 
for an astonishing 36 years and be filled for most of that time by Federal Judge John 
Feikens. Dubbed the ‘Sludge Judge’, Feikens oversaw plans mandating the construction 
of expensive pollution abatement mechanisms and the restructuring of the department 
to address personnel and procurement issues, which increasingly relied on contractors 
and consultants.
In 1981, the Michigan legislature passed a law that changed how wholesale rates 
could be calculated. Instead of mandating that they be ‘reasonable’ for the actual ser-
vice delivered, the law required that rates be ‘based on the actual cost of service as 
determined under the utility basis of rate-making’.5 In 1980, the department had con-
tracted the consulting firm Camp, Dresser & McKee to determine how to calculate 
rates according to this logic, which incorporated revenue requirements along with dif-
ferences in the costs of serving different municipalities (Camp, Dresser & McKee, 1980). 
Based on the American Water Works Association criteria, the new rate structure took 
into account the ‘major concerns of suburban wholesale customers regarding cost 
allocations, unaccounted-for water, and the costs associated with Detroit’s retail water 
distribution system’ (ibid.: 1–1). In effect, this basis of accounting addressed the suburban 
alliance’s concerns that they were unfairly shouldering part of the city’s own costs and 
created a system whereby rates would be calculated according to each municipality’s 
actual costs in an attempt to remain close to a market system of allocation.
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, suburban charges against the water 
department administration contributed to characterizations of the City of Detroit as 
administratively incompetent, discriminatory––and ultimately criminal and corrupt. 
White suburban politicians thus drew on existing racial stereotypes to deflect their res-
ponsibility to pay for an overbuilt water system, instead blaming city administrators for 
mismanaging the system and constituting the primary cause of rising costs.
Realizing crisis in a stigmatized city (from the 1990s to the 2010s)
By the 1990s and the 2000s, the water system had emerged as a central site 
for stig matizing Detroit’s leadership, and the infrastructure proved vastly overbuilt. In 
2013, the system pumped less water––610 millions of gallons daily––than it had in 1954 
(when it pumped 695 million gallons). Its peak capacity was enormous: the pipes were 
capable of sending up to 1,700 million gallons of water per day throughout the region, 
which significantly exceeded the actual peak usage of around 900 million gallons 
(Mowitz and Wright, 1962: 171; Detroit Water and Sewerage Department, 2014).6 Fewer 
people and industries paying into a system with an estimated 80% of its budget dedicated 
to fixed-cost items meant that each household was forced to bear a higher proportion of 
the department’s overheads (Detroit Water and Sewerage Department, 2009: 4). Those 
5 Michigan State Act No. 34 of 1917, available from http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-123-141 (accessed 10 
April 2014).
6 This information was corroborated during a meeting with the department’s finance team on 28 October 2014.
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who remained in the city bore a higher proportion of the system’s fixed costs, paying 
more on average than suburban residents despite significantly lower average incomes 
(Butts and Gasteyer, 2011).
Meanwhile, the department’s Master Plan of 2004 predicted that ‘approxi ma-
tely US $4.6 billion will be needed by the year 2020, largely due to the need to catch up 
on previously deferred rehabilitation and replacement (R and R) of aged infrastructure’ 
(CH2MHill, 2004: 1–2). The combined challenges of raising revenue and maintaining 
increasingly aging and abandoned infrastructures contributed to this deferment. More-
over, the financialization of the department had resulted in an organization more highly 
dependent on debt capital than revenue: whereas in 1970 only 30% of each water revenue 
dollar was put towards replacements and improvements to the system, by 2010 around 
80% of each dollar was used for debt service and bond capital financing, demonstrating 
that the suburban-preferred system of debt financing had succeeded.7
Meanwhile, suburban leaders continued to rely on tropes of unfairness, incom-
petence and corruption to buttress their opposition, while many of Detroit’s leaders 
responded to these stigmatizing charges by defending the system as a core city asset 
and source of economic development. As the city moved into its next round of ‘crises’––
the conviction of former Detroit mayor Kwame Kilpatrick on federal charges and state 
appointment of an Emergency Manager who filed for city bankruptcy––long-standing 
accusations of mismanagement provided implicit justification for the city’s increasingly 
diminished sovereignty.
In the 1990s and 2000s, a new crop of suburban leaders ascended, inheriting 
both the rhetorical and tactical approaches of their predecessors. They introduced a 
steady stream of legislation––in 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2012––seeking 
to shift control over the water system to the suburbs and challenging rate hikes with 
allegations of profiteering and mismanagement. Suburban Oakland County Executive 
L. Brooks Patterson, a leading figure in Michigan politics, who built his career on 
maintaining one of the highest county credit ratings, was essential to the water politics 
that ensued. Patterson had gained national recognition for successfully defending 
suburban municipalities against regional busing to promote integration in the Milliken 
v. Bradley (1974) US Supreme Court case. He revived claims developed in the 1970s, 
interrupting the brief ‘cease-fire’ that had begun when Dennis Archer was elected as 
mayor in 1994, by explicitly continuing characterizations of the mayor as corrupt: ‘I 
don’t think (Detroit Mayor Dennis) Archer will be any more willing to give up that cash 
cow than Coleman Young’, he charged, referring to the water department (Ourlian et 
al., 1995). Archer, in turn, stated that suburban attempts to gain majority control over 
the department had become an ‘emotional issue’ for Detroiters (McWhirter and Brand-
Williams, 1999).
Patterson was not alone in his charges against the department. In 2002, leaders 
from the inner-ring, working-class and majority-white suburb of Warren fought against 
the city in court, alleging that the municipality had been overcharged for several years. 
They supported a fresh legislative initiative to gain a suburban majority on the water 
board. Suburban leaders claimed that the department had refused to release its rate 
calculation formula. Warren City Attorney George Constance led the charge in 2002 by 
introducing a bill in the Michigan State House of Representatives and publicly serving 
papers for a lawsuit, which implied that there was malfeasance behind the city failing 
to provide its rate calculation formula. Constance explained, ‘There is a lot of interest 
in Warren and across Macomb County … People are telling us to move forward with our 
lawsuit because they have felt so powerless for a long time. They are glad someone is 
taking the bull by the horns’ (Schabath, 2002).
7 From page 6 of the DMWD annual report for 1970, and page 69 of the DWSD Summary of Operating Statistics for 
2010, both obtained through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
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Recapitulating charges made in the late 1970s, Patterson accused the Detroit 
department of discriminating against suburban municipalities. Patterson’s rationale for 
renewing attacks against Detroit were rhetorically ‘color-blind’: he claimed to 
‘regionalize the water board and make sure that it is equitable and fair to all’ (Ourlian 
et al., 1995). However, making the board representative of its users would have granted 
majority-white suburban municipalities, who had been historically united, control over 
the utility without inheriting the risk of its debt. State Senator Laura Toy, a Republican 
from Livonia who sponsored the bill in 2006, explained: ‘We never wanted to buy into 
the system, we just wanted another set of eyes and ears on it’ (Wisely, 2006).
Calls for a majority-suburban board––whether in assembly or representative 
form––were also supported by accusations that the city department used its revenue 
for inappropriate purposes. In 2005, Oakland County Drain Commissioner John P. 
McCulloch, who was George Kuhn’s successor, reportedly ‘said water rates for suburban 
cities … have been artificially inflated “for years” and the rate increases are used to 
underwrite other projects in Detroit rather than just the water system’ (Nichols, 2005). 
Department Director Victor Mercado countered: ‘We have had tremendous strides in 
productivity increases, reductions in overtime and the overall cost of the system. But 
the capital improvement is the driving force … because you still need to improve the 
infrastructure’ (ibid.).
Suburban claims that their ratepayers were effectively subsidizing the high 
number of Detroit residents defaulting on their water bills drew on existing charac-
terizations of the department as unfair and exploitative and extended those stereotypes 
to Detroit residents. Suburban leaders had long argued that the department needed 
to shut off water connections for customers who defaulted on payments––people who 
had been stigmatized in the news as ‘deadbeats’ (Willcox, 1978). A series of articles 
published in 2002 called for increasing shutoffs, arguing that the department had not 
taken any action to collect the US $59.3 million it was owed (Bebow, 2002a). The Deputy 
Mayor of Warren, Mike Greiner, concluded: ‘We believe the city of Detroit is completely 
incapable of managing the water department, and this is just one more example of 
it’ (Wisely, 2004). Suburban leaders overlooked Detroiters’ increasing poverty and 
demolished industrial base, effectively denying their own potential responsibility for 
sharing these costs, while neoliberal expectations that every municipality be self-
sustaining provided laissez-faire legitimacy for their claims.
These debates revealed a divergence in how the department was framed by the 
suburban alliance and the city. While many black leaders in Detroit understood the 
department to be an asset essential to the city’s economic development and sovereignty, 
white suburban leaders claimed to be purely technocratic but favored governance and 
rate structures that worked in their interests by allowing them to deny fiscal respon si-
bility for the city’s deepening impoverishment. This became most apparent in debates 
over contracts, where opponents claimed moral superiority because of their professed 
‘color-blindness’ while labeling black Detroiters the perpetrators of racism because they 
referred to racial categories when expressing an affirmative action policy in hiring and 
contracting. In accordance with City of Detroit policy, the department had aimed to 
develop the local workforce and award 30% of contracts and supplies––which totaled 
around US $400 million annually––to Detroit-based companies and small firms (Bebow, 
2002b). Mary Blackmon, a Water Board Commissioner since 1988, had long framed 
the department as a mechanism for promoting Detroit’s economic development: ‘This 
board feels very strongly about equal opportunity for black-owned and Detroit-based 
businesses … It’s not just the bottom financial line here. What does the community get 
for this? It’s power’, she explained (ibid.).
At the same time, L. Brooks Patterson represented a popular opinion among 
white suburban leaders when he argued that the best way to expand on the number 
of black-owned businesses was to enact a color-blind procurement policy based on 
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his own county’s: ‘Oakland’s procurement system is simple: Companies fill out comput-
erized forms and get bid packets any time a related service is needed. Price––not race or 
gender––is the determining factor. It’s very clean’(ibid.). Republican State Representative 
Leon Drolet took the argument further: ‘Any time you require people to have a certain 
skin color to get a contract, those people are the ones who are making it into a racial 
issue’ (ibid.). While Blackmon promoted the department as an important source for 
the city’s economic sustainability and political sovereignty, suburban politicians such 
as Patterson and Drolet merged neoliberal ideas with euphemized racial biases to call 
for efficiency and transparency via the price mechanism in order to challenge the city’s 
prerogatives.
While suburban proponents of privatizing or regionalizing the water system 
invoked an outwardly ‘color-blind’ logic of market efficiency because it did not ref-
erence racial categories explicitly, Detroit leaders sought to repair their stigmatized 
status by charging that suburban efforts to gain control over the water system were part 
of a larger design to wrest power from the black-led city. Detroit NAACP Executive 
Direc tor Heaster Wheeler confronted his suburban colleagues: ‘With this water issue 
and other issues, many black people are wondering: Why are you raping our city? 
Why are you trying to take governmental control, which is power, from black leaders?’ 
(McWhirter and Brand-Williams, 1999). Or, as Detroit City Council member Kwame 
Kenyatta elaborated, the water issue affected regional cooperation more generally: 
‘This creates animosity and feelings of racism across the board when it comes to other 
discussions. Okay now, if I can’t have a good relationship with you over the water, then 
how am I going to have a good relationship with you over transportation?’8 Black leaders 
understood suburban opposition to be an attack on black sovereignty, which, by naming 
otherwise euphemized racial biases, invited backlash from white leaders who accused 
the city of stirring up those antagonisms in the first place.
In the 2010s, Detroit suffered a reputational crisis resulting from the city’s 
former mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick, being convicted of profiting from city contracts. In 
2014, Victor Mercado, who had been appointed as Director of the water depart ment by 
Judge Feikens and had served under Kilpatrick, was found guilty of conspiracy for his 
involvement in steering contracts to Kilpatrick’s associates. Ironically, the department 
was under a federal consent decree (from the 1977 EPA case) at the time, which had 
designated Kilpatrick as the department’s Special Administra tor  and allowed him to 
bypass the Water Board for the approval of contracts and  exten sions, which he did 
in order to direct money into the pocket of contractor Bobby Ferguson. This crisis 
of confidence was soon followed by Governor Rick Snyder  assign ing an Emergency 
Manager to oversee the city in March 2013, the first time the depart ment had 
been without federal oversight since 1977. With the subsequent filing for munic ipal 
bankruptcy, the department was ultimately restructured into the regional Great Lakes 
Water Authority, which began to lease infrastructure from Detroit for an annual fee 
from 2016.
While allegations of the Detroit administration’s ineptitude and corruption stem 
from the mid-1970s, when no evidence was cited or found for these claims, events in the 
2000s saw these accusations reaching fruition. Suburban leaders continued to assault 
the city department––amplifying earlier charges of bias, profiting, and criminality––
while city leaders defended the department as a source of economic development. By 
this time, however, those charges had become reality, as Detroit’s administration was 
increasingly being supplanted by state and federal oversight. Meanwhile, the vicious 
cir cle of aggressiveness and defensiveness that had been set in motion prevented 
partner ships from forming across municipal lines, effectively sheltering suburban 
8 Interview with Council member Kwame Kenyatta, 13 October 2011.
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muni cipalities from the costs of Detroit’s abandonment––particularly from the inher-
ited costs of an overbuilt and increasingly regulated water infrastructure.
Discussion: the frustrated regional politics of stigmatization
Few would dispute that the City of Detroit is an extreme case study in territorial 
stigmatization. Coleman Young’s description of the city as ‘the blackest, most segre-
gated, most isolated, most restructured, most abandoned, most disenfranchised, most 
detested, and possibly the most feared city in America’ has remained both provocative 
yet poignant for decades now, supporting the idea of Detroit as an exemplary case of 
territorial stigmatization (Young and Wheeler, 1994: 325). Territorial stigma, then, as 
we have seen here, can develop from regional politics––where impoverished deindus-
trialized cities such as Detroit become labeled as inept and corrupt by their regional 
neighbors, effectively placing the responsibility for urban problems onto the city itself 
and foreclosing larger scales for distributing the fiscal burden.
This finding pushes the argument for the formation of territorial stigmatization 
further by demonstrating how territorial stigma can be cultivated through active polit-
ical campaigns that draw on patterns of racial and ethnic segregation, thus contributing 
to the growing literature on the origins of territorial stigma in bureaucratic structures 
(Larsen, 2014), media sources (Glasze et al., 2012) and ethnic succession (Cohen, 2013). 
This article has sought to identify an important source of territorial stigma in the struc-
tural and relational conditions of social divides and state boundaries––which together 
allow the stigma to be cultivated in order to divert cost distribution questions and make 
Detroit independently responsible for its abandoned condition.
In this case, the organization of a suburban alliance and the use of racialized 
labels vis-à-vis the water department emerged shortly after Coleman Young took office 
in 1974, after which an important city department was stigmatized as discriminatory, 
dangerous, inept and corrupt––codes that drew on existing stereotypes of African 
Americans but grafted them onto an institution. Although rate hikes were often high––
for example, the 39% rise in 1976––they were met with disproportionate allegations of 
corruption rather than being presented with the identification of particular practices 
of graft. The region’s ongoing tendency to attribute city problems to Coleman Young 
was made apparent in a landmark investigative report on the Detroit bankruptcy, which 
challenged this characterization in its headline, finding that Young was the only Detroit 
mayor to oversee budgets with more revenue than debt since 1950, despite the region’s 
ongoing tendency to blame him for Detroit’s problems (Bomey and Gallagher, 2013).
The objective of this analysis has not been to locate the sources of territorial 
stigma in individual psyches, but rather to identify how the stigma was generated and 
whom it benefited––in other words, its relational social origins and consequences. Many 
of the suburban politicians who collaborated to villainize the department enjoyed suc-
cessful political careers lasting several decades, suggesting that their actions were 
widely endorsed in the majority-white region. Moreover, filing long-running court cases 
and using rhetorical intimidation tactics were useful defenses to employ when the city 
was contending with a diminished tax base from commercial and residential abandon-
ment, less federal aid for infrastructure, the 1970s recession and the expensive require-
ments of the 1972 Clean Water Act. This politics of intimidation deterred the city from 
raising rates on suburban customers because increases were likely to lead to allegations 
of profiteering and corruption, and litigation would require ample resources and take 
years to resolve. Suburban politicians thus benefited electorally by defaming Detroit, 
while also reducing their responsibility for legacy and regulatory costs.
An example of ‘real existing regionalism’ (Addie and Keil, 2015), this case com-
bines analyses of discourse, territories and technologies that help us consider how 
regions actually operate––acknowledging that they are grounded in their own  social 
con texts and historical experiences. In Michigan, a 1926 act halted the annexation of 
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sub urban municipalities that, when combined with existing social cleavages, allowed 
Detroit’s suburbs to maintain relative independence––even while other cities were able 
to incorporate their regional neighbors (Rusk, 2003: 55; Galster, 2012: 53). The water 
department is an important site for understanding why regional cooperation has so 
frequently failed in the Detroit metropolitan region. As an explicitly regional enterprise, 
the department offered a target for suburban assaults. Indeed, these water disputes, 
which are a crucial site for understanding the reinforcement of regional divides, have 
effectively reinscribed racial divisions onto municipal boundaries in an effort to defend 
the unequal distribution of resources (Omi and Winant, 2008).
The fact that the city’s administration was cast as predatory without evidence of 
maladministration in the 1970s did not mean that real acts of corruption did not occur 
later, as mentioned. The politics of stigmatization has some consequences for actual 
graft. First of all, territorial stigma tends to transform individual acts of corruption into 
evidence of more general stereotyping about a group. For example, one corrupt black 
administrator can effectively taint the population of black leaders as a whole, whereas 
for white leaders such characterizations tend to remain con fined to the individual. 
Secondly, once an administrative group is given a stigmatizing label, it logically follows 
that the cost of administrations actually engaging in those activ ities decreases. This 
can ironically create the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, an onslaught 
of stigmatizing labels may open up opportunities for city leaders to claim to protect 
residents from dangerous outsiders even while they are themselves engaging in 
unsavory activities. In Detroit’s case, for example, Kilpatrick was able to use city–
suburban antipathy to claim that he was protecting city interests from suburban attack, 
even while he was squandering public funds through inflated contracts. By focusing 
political attention on outside aggressors, internal criticism may be diminished.
The politics of stigma can also lead to a cycle of frustrated politics. When the 
city’s water department challenged suburban independence by exerting authority and 
raising suburban rates, the suburbs took the opportunity to organize against the city, 
labeling its administration as incompetent and thieving. City leaders responded defen-
sively to protect their sovereignty and resources, which became fresh evidence for sub-
















figure 3 The vicious circle of territorial stigma (source: author’s research)
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associated the city administration with the territory and finally with the residents them-
selves, with characterizations of ineptitude becoming so normalized that actual fraud 
eventually came to reinforce existing stereotypes. In other words, territorial stigmati-
zation became an influence that ‘not only denie[d] blacks their rights as citizens but 
force[d] them to bear the social costs of their own victimization’ (Massey and Denton, 
1993: 16).
Part of the process of territorial stigmatization, Wacquant (2007: 69) tells us, is 
that once a place has been deemed criminal, it becomes ‘easy for the authorities to justify 
special measures, deviating from both law and custom, which can have the effect––if 
not the intention––of destabilizing and further marginalizing their occupants’. While 
Wacquant focused on neighborhood-level criminality, particularly mass incarceration, 
we have seen that this can also apply to city administrations. For, just as special mea-
sures such as militarized policing can be implemented at the neighborhood level, at 
the municipal scale the state, national government or an international authority may 
enter to challenge that territory’s authority––its very sovereignty––based on allegations 
of corruption.
Conclusion
These established but localized battles over water in Detroit made international 
headlines in the middle of 2014, when the city’s water department paid a contractor, 
Homrich, US $5.6 million to shut off the water supply to 33,607 Detroit customers 
(Thibodeau, 2015). As families ran improvised water pipes into neighbors’ houses 
and community members brought packaged water to homes, activists charged that 
shutting off water amounted to human-rights abuse––for not only were water  con-
nections severed, but children were removed from family homes, as a water shutoff was 
deemed reason enough for parents to be classified as unfit by the state. In October 2014, 
two representatives from the United Nations visited the city and added international 
legitimacy to local activists’ claims (Gottesdiener, 2014). As these events were dis-
seminated via the international media, questions were raised about how such a situa-
tion could have arisen in a region that enjoys the greatest freshwater abundance in the 
world.
As I have argued here, the politics of distribution in Detroit’s water department 
have long been an essential site for the frustrated politics of stigmatization––a cultural 
politics that has helped suburban residents avoid shouldering the costs of an overbuilt 
and increasingly regulated utility in an abandoned and deindustrialized city. Through 
their organized resistance, suburban leaders effectively called for a system that charges 
rates according to a formula to determine actual costs––however difficult those may be 
to calculate in practice––thereby effectively denying responsibility for legacy costs and 
rising city poverty. In a bitter paradox, longstanding suburban accusations that Detroit 
residents were benefitting from lower rates were effectively upended, as thousands 
of Detroit residents suffered the devastating consequences of the shutoffs when they 
were unable to pay their bills. Although some causes of the shutoff crisis were more 
immediate––for instance, the increasing amount of debt due to credit swaps in the early 
2000s (Bromey and Gallagher, 2013) and the department’s desire to demonstrate its will 
to recoup revenue in the face of neoliberal expectations––many aspects were several 
decades in the making. For, while the suburbs fought for the city to pay a higher share 
of the region’s costs, Detroit residents were made increasingly responsible for a share of 
the costs even while they were less able to afford them.
Theoretically, this article has argued for recognizing and further investigating 
how, under what conditions and with what effects territorial stigma is propagated 
across administrative boundaries. Here, I have demonstrated how the symbolic politics 
of stigma are cultivated through, and in turn affect, the distribution of critical material 
resources. Often, especially under regimes of euphemization such as the post-1960s 
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US racial landscape, the tropes that are leveraged in order to uphold systems of urban 
inequality remain implicit and widely accepted. In order to call attention to these, we 
must continue to identify the historical sources leading to the development of territorial 
stigmatization and attempt to link those sources more explicitly with their pernicious 
and enduring effects.
Dana Kornberg, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Room 3115, 500  
South. State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1382, USA, danakorn@umich.edu
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